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Abstract—High energy particles from cosmic rays or packaging
materials can generate a glitch or a current transient (single event
transient or SET) in a logic circuit. This SET can eventually get
captured in a register resulting in a flip of the register content,
which is known as soft error or single-event upset (SEU). A
soft error is typically modeled as a probabilistic single bit-flip
model. In developing such abstract fault models, an important
issue to consider is the likelihood of multiple bit errors caused
by particle strikes. The fact that an SET causes multiple flips is
noted in the literature. We perform a characterization study of
the impact of an SET on a logic circuit to quantify the extent
to which an SET can cause multiple bit flips. We use post-
layout circuit simulations and Monte Carlo sampling scheme
to get accurate bit-flip statistics. We perform our simulations
on ISCAS’85, ISCAS’89 and ITC’99 benchmarks in 180nm
and 65nm technologies. We find that a substantial fraction of
SEU outcomes had multiple register flips. We futher analyse
the individual contributions of the strike on a register and the
strike on a logic gate, to multiple flips. We find that, amongst
the erroneous outcomes, the probability of multiple bit-flips for
‘gate-strike’ cases was substantial and went up to 50%, where as
those for ‘register-strike’ cases was just about 2%. This implies
that, in principle, we can eliminate the flips due to register strikes
using hardened flip-flop designs. However, in such designs, out
of the remaining flips which will be due to gate strikes, a large
fraction is likely to be multiple flips.
Index Terms—soft error, gate strike, multiple bit flips, fault
model, logic circuits
I. INTRODUCTION
S
OFT errors are known to have a significant impact
on circuit reliability. High energy particles from either
cosmic rays or packaging materials are the major contributors
towards soft errors. When such particles strike a semiconduc-
tor substrate, they generate charge which in turn results in a
glitch or a transient current in a circuit. Such a glitch is called
the single event transient (SET). The SET can occur on a
register or on a logic gate and can propagate to eventually get
captured in a register, altering the stored bit (0→ 1 or 1→ 0).
Such an error is known as a single event upset (SEU) or
soft error. The cosmic rays interact with earth’s atmosphere
creating secondary particles, mainly neutrons, protons, muons
and pions, as they penetrate down to the sea level. The
energy or flux of these particles increases at a rate of 5x
per 5000 feet, reaching a maximum intensity at about 12-
15 km from sea level [1], [2]. Thus, the errors caused due
to these particles were of specific interest in satellite, aircraft
and space applications. For example, in-flight measurements
reveal an upset rate of approximately 5x10-3 upsets per hour
per memory device [3].
Several studies were then conducted by IBM and were
also summarized by Boeing Defense and Space group, which
reveal that a significant amount of neutron flux is found even
at sea level [1], [4]. The average low energy neutron flux
(around 10MeV) at sea level is reported to be nearly 100000
neutrons/sq.cm per year [1]. They report that thousands of
upsets happen every year at the ground level, which are
mainly recorded by computer systems having error detection
and correction logs. For instance, the average error rate in
memories observed in several computers were reported to be
nearly 1.5e-12 upsets/bit-hr and most of the upsets are reported
to be due to atmospheric neutrons [4]. Thus, SEUs caused due
to neutrons gained significant importance. Most early studies
focused on SEUs only in memories. SEUs in logic circuits
were not considered because such circuits exhibit inherent
masking phenomena, which prevented the SETs from getting
captured in a register/flip-flop. However, as technology scales,
the impact of masking phenomena tends to reduce [5], [6],
[7], [8] and it is important to study SEUs in logic circuits.
At the architectural level, soft errors are commonly modeled
by a probabilistic single bit-flip fault model [9], [10], [11],
[12]. In developing such abstract fault models, an important
issue to consider is the likelihood of multiple bit errors caused
by particle strikes. This likelihood has been studied to a great
extent in memories, but has not been understood to the same
extent in logic circuits. This model has been challenged in
[13], [14], [15], [16], which report that multiple bit flips do
occur in logic circuits. However, the state-of-art fault model
continues to be a single bit-flip, single cycle model for soft
error in logic circuits. Reliability estimates (such as mean time
to failure/MTTF) and reliability enhancement techniques (such
as error correction codes etc) are also based on the assumption
that a single bit flip occurs due to a particle strike. However,
in reality, if multiple errors occur, these MTTF estimates
are likely to be optimistic and the error correction methods
are likely to be insufficient. Most of the existing techniques
that estimate soft error rate (SER) use approximate modeling
techniques to arrive at these conclusions which reduces the
accuracy of their results [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. Therefore
it is essential that our estimation technique be as accurate as
possible, in order to increase the confidence in the conclusions
on the multiple bit flip probability in logic circuits. So, we
perform a detailed characterization of the impact of an SET
using post-layout circuit (SPICE) simulations and Monte Carlo
sampling scheme in order to get accurate bit-flip statistics. Our
goal is to quantify the extent to which the single bit-flip fault
2model is accurate.
We performed a basic characterization to this extent in
an earlier work [22]. We evaluate the bit-flip statistics by
comparing the SET- induced circuit simulation with a fault-
free register-transfer-level (RTL) reference simulation. In our
simulations, we assume that an SET affects a single tran-
sistor [23], [24]. We run our experiments on the ISCAS’85,
ISACAS’89 and ITC’99 benchmark circuits in 180nm and
65nm technologies. We found that the impact of an SET in
a circuit can be understood as a two-cycle phenomenon, that
is, the SEU outcomes need to be observed across two clock
cycles (the cycle which had the SET injected and the following
clock cycle) in order to accurately capture the phenomenon.
This leads us to the fact that there are several possible SEU
outcomes. We estimated the relative probabilities of all SEU
outcomes and the conditional probability of multiple flips
given that there is at least one error. In other words, given
that an SET propagates and causes an error in a flip-flop in
either of the two clock cycles, what is the probability that it
can flip multiple flip-flops? We analyse these results further
and evaluate this probability separately for strikes on logic
gates and strikes on registers to understand their individual
contributions.
We find that, overall, up to 8% of the erroneous outcomes
result in multiple bit-flips. Although this probability is low, it
can a have significant impact on error-detection or correction
schemes. It means that a single bit error correction scheme
can go wrong in as much as 8% of the cases, and these errors
will go down as silent undetected errors. The probability of
multiple errors also increases as technology is scaled (based
on 180nm and 65nm data). A key observation is that, amongst
the erroneous outcomes, the probability of multiple bit-flips for
‘gate-strike’ cases was substantial and went up to 50%, that
is, these errors are caused due to the propagation of the SET
from the logic gate to the flip-flop. On the other hand, out
of the erroneous outcomes, the likelihood of multiple flips for
‘register-strike’ cases was just about 2%. This implies that,
if we were to do hardened flip-flop designs to eliminate the
flips due to register strikes, then in such designs, out of the
remaining flips which will be due to ‘gate strikes’, a large
fraction will be multiple flips. So, although the traditional
circuit designs with hardened flip-flops will solve one problem,
they will uncover a different problem.
Thus, our study reveals that multiple flips are quite likely
and are likely to increase with technology scaling. Reliability
estimation/enhancement approaches based on the single bit-
flip model are likely to be optimistic. Gate-strikes are the
key contributors to multiple flips. Robust flip-flop designs
may not help; we may need to look at methods such as
modifying the path delays or designs such as delay-capture
flip-flops to reduce the likelihood of multiple errors due to
gate-strikes. Enough precautions need to be taken at the
layout/circuit/system level so that the single bit-flip model can
be used with a higher degree of confidence.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section II,
we provide a brief introduction to the two-cycle phenomenon
and describe the possible SEU outcomes in a logic circuit.
We describe the experimental setup in Section III. We present
Figure 1. A flip occurs in both clock cycles due to the SET occurring early
in the clock cycle
our simulation results on ISCAS’85, ISCAS’89 and ITC’99
benchmarks in Section IV. In Section V, we summarize our
paper.
II. TWO-CYCLE PHENOMENON AND THE POSSIBLE SEU
OUTCOMES
In a logic circuit, a high-energy particle can strike a logic
gate or a register, resulting in an SET. We call this the ‘gate-
strike’ and ‘register-strike’ respectively. We model the SET as
a current injection at the drain of a transistor in a particular
clock cycle ‘k’. This SET can eventually propagate and get
captured in a register or a flip-flop in the same clock cycle
‘k’ or in the subsequent clock cycle ‘k+1’, depending on the
time instant at which the SET occurs in clock cycle ‘k’. These
two possibilities can be explained as follows. If the SET flips a
register content early in the clock cycle ‘k’, it will have enough
time to propagate and flip some register in clock cycle‘k+1’,
as illustrated in Figure 1. However, if the SET flips a register
later in the clock cycle ‘k’, the error will not have enough time
to propagate and flip some other register in the subsequent
clock cycle ‘k+1’, as illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, the impact
of an SET, in reality, needs to be viewed across two clock
cycles to accurately capture the phenomenon. We call this the
‘two-cycle phenomenon’. This time dependence of the strike
is currently missing in the single bit flip, single cycle fault
model.
We now classify the flips and come up with a systematic
notation for the possible SEU outcomes across two clock
cycles. This is shown in Figure 3. In the figure, ‘N’ stands
for no-flip, ‘F’ stands for flip and ‘Fm’ stands for multiple
flips. So, the illustrations in Figure 1 and 2 can be classified
as ‘FF’ and ‘FN’ type of outcomes respectively as per this
terminology. Thus, the occurrence of second flip depends on
the time instant at which the SET occurred in the first clock
cycle. Flips in the subsequent clock cycles can be understood
completely based on logical propagation of the flip in the
second cycle which occurs on the clock edge.
3Figure 2. A flip does not propagate in time to the next cycle due to the SET
occurring late in the clock cycle
Figure 3. A systematic notation for the possible error (SEU) outcomes caused
due to an SET in a logic circuit
Since we are interested in evaluating the accuracy of the
single bit-flip model, we focus on the likelihood of multiple
register flips. The ones caused directly as a result of the SET
are denoted by ‘NFm’, ‘FmF’ and ‘FmN’. The multiple flip
caused due to the propagation of the previous flip is denoted
by ‘FFm’, which will be anyway captured by modeling the first
flip using the traditional single bit-flip model. So, the multiple
flips in this case are not a direct result of the SET and we do
not consider this in our experiments.
III. SIMULATION SETUP
We perform our simulations on the ISCAS’85, ISCAS’89 and
ITC’99 benchmark circuits in 180nm and 65nm technologies.
We model the SET as a current injection at the drain of a single
transistor [23], [24]. A fixed glitch is used in our experiments
and we assume that the probability that an SET affects a
drain is proportional to its area. We use the scaling trends
presented in [25] to arrive at the glitch height and width for
the technology we simulate.
Each circuit that we perform our experiment on, is de-
scribed as a Verilog or VHDL netlist (RTL). The circuit is
implemented to layout using synthesis and placement-route
(PNR) tools. The post-layout Verilog and circuit netlist are
then extracted. We simulate the post-layout Verilog netlist with
a representative test-bench using the ModelSim [26] simulator
and store the input/output values of all the flip-flops (registers).
These are called as the reference values. From the post-layout
circuit netlist, we generate ‘sample circuit simulation decks’
by picking a random clock cycle (k) for simulation, selecting
a random drain (d) to inject the SET and selecting a random
time instant (t) in the clock cycle to inject the SET.
The sample circuit is simulated for three clock cycles as
shown in Figure 2 and the register outputs are recorded at two
clock instants: ‘k’ and ‘k+1’. We use the Ngspice or Hspice
circuit simulators [27] to perform our simulations. In the (k-
1)th clock cycle, the input registers of the circuit netlist are
initialized with the corresponding input values obtained from
the RTL reference values for that clock cycle. In the kth clock
cycle, we inject the SET at a random point in time (t) in the
clock cycle. Inputs to the circuit change at the falling edge of
the clock cycle k, so that there is sufficient setup time. We
note the register outputs at the rising edges of clock cycles k
and k + 1. The register values from the SET injected circuit
simulation are compared with the corresponding reference val-
ues from the fault-free RTL simulation. Differences between
the sampled values in the circuit simulation and the reference
values are recorded as bit-flips in the respective clock cycles.
We generate several sample simulation decks with different
(d,k,t) values. The average number of sample circuit simu-
lations run for each circuit was about 4000. We ran these
simulations in parallel using GNU Parallel [28] on a high
performance computing cluster in Centre for Development
of Advanced Computing (CDAC) Pune, India, which utilizes
multiple cores. The time taken to run these many simulations
for each circuit was on an average about 1 to 2 hours. The
key advantage of running the post-layout circuit simulations is
that they capture all the masking phenomena accurately. With
the availability of the high performance cluster with multi-core
facility, these simulations can be run in a reasonable amount
of time.
We extract the bit-flip information from each simulation
and then classify these flips into one of the SEU outcomes
described in Figure 3. We continue to generate the circuit
samples until the standard error (Standard deviation√
N
) is reduced
to less than 10% of the value of the estimate. The probabilities
obtained from this Monte Carlo sampling experiment fall
within the 95% confidence interval. The experimental setup
is briefly described in Algorithm 1. This entire process is
automated using a set of python and perl scripts.
IV. RESULTS
We perform our experiments on ISCAS’85 (c432 etc), IS-
CAS’89 (s344 etc) and ITC’99 (b01 etc) benchmark circuits
in 180nm and 65nm technologies. Flip-flops (registers) are
4Algorithm 1 Experimental setup to perform the circuit level
characterization of the impact of an SET
Input: Verilog/VHDL description of circuit
• Perform Synthesis of the Verilog/VHDL description
• Perform placement and route of the resulting Synthesis
output
• Extract the post-layout Verilog and SPICE netlists
• Simulate the post-layout Verilog netlist using ModelSim
for 10000 clock cycles
• Store the input and output values of all flip-flops at every
clock cycle
• for (Number of simulations)
{
• Create a sample simulation netlist from the post-layout
SPICE netlist:
{
– Pick a random drain d of a transistor at which the
SET will be injected
– Pick a random clock cycle k from the reference trace
for simulation
– Pick the inputs to the sample netlist from the chosen
clock cycle k
– Inject the SET at a random time instant t in the
selected clock cycle
}
• Simulate the sample SPICE netlist with parameters d, k, t
for 3 clock cycles
• Store the output values of all flip-flops at the 2nd and 3rd
clock edges
• Compare the outputs from SPICE netlist with that of the
Verilog netlist
• Note any discrepancy in the output as a bit-flip
• Evaluate the conditional probability of multiple flips
given at least one error occured
• Simulations are run to reach a 95% confidence interval
}
Output: Calculate the statistics of all SEU outcomes
added to the inputs and outputs of the combinational circuits
of the ISCAS’85 benchmarks. Clock frequency for each circuit
is set to the maximum operable frequency of the post-layout
netlist, which is determined by post-layout timing analysis.
We calculate the probability of a ‘gate-strike’ and ‘register-
strike’ depending on whether the SET was injected on a gate
or a register. Further, we classify the bit-flips into one of the
SEU outcomes described in Figure 3. Our key focus is on
quantifying the extent to which multiple flips occur. We further
evaluate the multiple bit flip probability contributed indepen-
dently by the ‘gate-strike’ and ‘register strike’ scenarios.
A. Probabilities of SET outcomes
In Table I, we show the observed probabilities of all the
SEU outcomes under the condition that the SET occurs at a
register (‘register strike’) as shown below.
• PNN = P (NN |strike on register)
• PNF = P (NF |strike on register)
Figure 4. Probability of at least one bit-flip for ‘gate-strike’ and ‘register-
strike’ scenarios
• PFN = P (FN |strike on register)
• PFF = P (FF |strike on register)
In Table II, we tabulate these SEU probabilities under the
condition that the SET occurs at a logic gate ( ‘gate-strike’).
A ‘-’ in the table means that the outcome did not occur. The
key observations are as follows:
• In both ‘register strike’ and ‘gate strike’ cases (Table I
and Table II), PNN , that is, probability of no-flips is
dominant, that is, the SET causes no flips.
• The probability 1− PNN indicates the probability that a
flip or an error occurred. This is plotted in Figure 4. The
flip probability for register-strike cases is substantially
greater (nearly 10x greater) than that for the gate-strike
cases. This indicates that, when an SET occurs on a
register, it is more likely to cause an error, than one at
a gate. Protecting the flip-flops or having robust flip-flop
designs can help reduce this flip probability.
• From Figure 4, we note that the flip probabilities are
higher in the 65nm technology, which means that, as
technology scales, the likelihood of an error increases.
• In the case of strike on a register, from Table I we observe
that, PFN and PFF are dominant as compared to PNF .
This implies that, when an SET occurs at a register, it is
more likely to cause a flip in the same clock cycle (clock
cycle ‘k’).
• On the other hand, when an SET occurs on a logic gate,
from Table II we can see that the probabilities of PFN
and PFF are extremely small as compared to PNF . This
indicates that, when a strike occurs on a logic gate in
clock cycle ‘k’, the register flip is most likely to occur
due to the propagation of the SET and hence, the flip is
likely to occur in the subsequent clock cycle ‘k+1’.
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SEU OUTCOME PROBABILITIES WHEN THE SET OCCURS AT A REGISTER
Example PNN
180nm
PNN
65nm
PNF
180nm
PNF
65nm
PFN
180nm
PFN
65nm
PFF
180nm
PFF
65nm
c432 0.824 0.777 0.003 0.0275 0.136 0.166 0.035 0.028
c499 0.82 0.767 0.01 0.029 0.1 0.113 0.065 0.089
c880 0.811 0.774 0.005 0.0225 0.115 0.135 0.067 0.067
c1355 0.824 0.759 0.003 0.027 0.098 0.11 0.072 0.102
c1908 0.83 0.746 0.006 0.037 0.112 0.137 0.05 0.078
b01 0.833 0.712 0.013 0.038 0.088 0.116 0.064 0.133
b03 0.806 0.7583 0.006 0.034 0.046 0.065 0.14 0.141
b04 0.822 0.808 0.002 0.012 0.05 0.057 0.124 0.122
b06 0.818 0.755 0.0128 0.024 0.117 0.156 0.051 0.063
b09 0.827 0.766 0.006 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.141 0.183
b10 0.848 0.771 0.003 0.029 0.011 0.022 0.136 0.177
b11 0.845 0.811 0.006 0.022 0.025 0.046 0.121 0.119
b13 0.81 0.81 0.008 0.026 0.012 0.013 0.168 0.146
s344 0.829 0.749 0.011 0.046 0.136 0.17 0.024 0.033
s820 0.828 0.715 0.024 0.022 0.115 0.159 0.031 0.1
s1196 0.823 0.756 0.014 0.025 0.155 0.2 0.008 0.018
s1238 0.825 0.723 0.007 0.039 0.157 0.219 0.01 0.018
s1423 0.817 0.78 0.004 0.026 0.112 0.103 0.066 0.089
3:8 decoder 0.781 0.732 0.021 0.041 0.156 0.154 0.04 0.072
8-bit LFSR 0.753 0.734 0.038 0.034 0.012 0.01 0.195 0.22
worst case
standard
error
±0.01 ±0.02 ±0.009 ±0.008 ±0.016 ±0.018 ±0.015 ±0.017
Table II
SEU OUTCOME PROBABILITIES WHEN THE SET OCCURS AT A LOGIC GATE (‘-’ INDICATES NO EVENTS WERE OBSERVED FOR THAT PARTICULAR CASE)
Example PNN
180nm
PNN
65nm
PNF
180nm
PNF
65nm
PFN
180nm
PFN
65nm
PFF
180nm
PFF
65nm
c432 0.996 0.98 0.003 0.019 - - - -
c499 0.993 0.979 0.004 0.019 0.001 0.0008 - -
c880 0.991 0.985 0.006 0.013 0.002 - - 0.0016
c1355 0.998 0.992 0.0016 0.007 - - - -
c1908 0.992 0.973 0.007 0.025 - - - 0.0005
b01 0.985 0.973 0.014 0.026 - - - -
b03 0.989 0.965 0.006 0.034 - - 0.003 -
b04 0.994 0.977 0.002 0.021 0.0005 0.001 0.002 -
b06 0.977 0.981 0.021 0.017 0.0004 0.0005 - -
b09 0.987 0.971 0.008 0.028 0.0005 - 0.003 -
b10 0.986 0.978 0.011 0.021 - - 0.002 -
b11 0.996 0.984 0.001 0.015 - - 0.002 -
b13 0.996 0.98 0.011 0.019 - - 0.0026 -
s344 0.995 0.976 0.004 0.022 - 0.001 - -
s820 0.996 0.992 0.0022 0.007 0.0015 - - -
s1196 0.997 0.988 0.003 0.01 - 0.001 - -
s1238 0.995 0.989 0.005 0.01 - - - -
s1423 0.998 0.983 0.002 0.015 - 0.001 - -
3:8 decoder 0.975 0.989 0.0185 0.01 0.006 - - -
8-bit LFSR 0.968 0.975 0.029 0.023 - - 0.001 0.0005
worst case
standard
error
±0.009 ±0.009 ±0.009 ±0.008 ±0.004 ±0.001 ±0.003 ±0.002
B. Probability of multiple register flips given an erroneous
outcome
Given that an error or a flip occurred due to an SET, that
is, one of these cases occurred- NF ∗, F ∗N or FF ∗ (where
F ∗ means one or more flips), what is the likelihood that the
first error event caused by the SET affects multiple registers?
There are two possibilities:
• The first error event occurs at cycle k + 1 and consists
of multiple registers being in error, that is, Pm =
P (NFm|atleast one flip).
• The first error event occurs at cycle k and con-
sists of multiple registers being in error, that is,
P (FmN |atleast one flip). There is another scenario
where the multiple flips leads to flip in the next cycle:
P (FmF |atleast one flip).
We do not consider the probability P (FFm|atleast one flip),
because the multiple flips in cycle k+1 are caused due to the
propagation of the first flip, which will be anyway captured
by modeling the first flip using the traditional single bit-flip
model. So, the multiple flips in this case are not a direct result
6of the SET.
Amongst the two cases mentioned above, we did not
come across the scenario of P (FmN |atleast one flip) or
P (FmF |atleast one flip) in our experiments, that is, multiple
flips in clock cycle ‘k’. Hence, we report the first probability:
Pm = P (NFm|atleast one flip). This is calculated as fol-
lows for both the gate-strike and register-strike (denoted by
reg-strike in the equation) cases put together:
Pm =
No. of (NFm)Gate−strike +No. of (NFm)reg−strike
(No. of cases with atleast one flip)gate+reg−strike
(1)
In other words, we calculate
Pm =
No. of (NFm)Gate−strike +No. of (NFm)reg−strike
(No. of NF, FN or FF )gate+reg−strike
(2)
For instance, if we ran 5000 simulations, out of which there
were 1000 cases in which at least one error occurred (this can
include NF , FN or FF across gate and register strikes),
out of which, say 100 cases had multiple errors (NFm), we
calculate Pm as 100/1000. This probability is shown in Table
IV for the benchmark circuits, across both register and gate
strikes.
Table III
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE BIT FLIPS GIVEN THAT AT LEAST ONE ERROR
OCCURRED ACROSS ALL STRIKES (‘-’ INDICATES NO MULTIPLE ERROR
EVENTS WERE OBSERVED)
Example Pm -
‘gate and
register
strike’
180nm
Pm-
‘gate and
register
strike’
65nm
c432 0.006 0.035
c499 0.003 0.016
c880 - 0.001
c1355 0.003 0.007
c1908 0.003 0.037
b01 - 0.02
b03 0.005 0.007
b04 - 0.03
b06 0.042 0.05
b09 0.005 0.044
b10 0.007 0.06
b11 - 0.036
b13 - 0.038
s344 - 0.02
s820 - 0.081
s1196 - 0.014
s1238 - 0.022
s1423 - 0.028
3:8
decoder
0.006 0.014
8-bit LFSR 0.007 0.018
From Table IV, we see that the maximum probability
of multiple flips Pm that was observed in the circuits we
simulated, across both register and gate strikes was 8%.
This probability is significantly higher in most of the 65nm
implementations as compared to the 180nm implementations.
This probability is likely to depend on several factors such
as the number of flip-flops, presence of balanced paths, logic
depth, logic gates, input combinations and so on. Although
8% seems low, it can still have a significant impact on error
detection and correction schemes. This means that, a single
error correction scheme can go wrong 8% of the times and
the errors can go down as silent undetected errors.
C. The contribution of gate strikes and register strikes to
multiple register flips
In this section, we analyze our results further to understand
the role of gate-strikes and register-strikes independently on
the multiple flip probability. In other words, we address the
following question. Given that an error occurred due to a
strike on a logic gate, what is the probability that it was a
multiple flip? This is denoted by PGM . Similarly, we calculate
the multiple flip probability PRM given that an error was
caused due to a register strike. We calculate PGM and PRM
respectively as follows:
PGM =
Number of (NFm)gate−strike
(Number of NF, FN or FF )gate−strike
(3)
PRM =
Number of (NFm)register−strike
(Number of NF, FN or FF )register−strike
(4)
In these equations, we should note that, the denominator
in both the fractions is the total number of cases which had
erroneous outcomes (flips). For the gate strike scenario, when
an SET occurs on a logic gate in clock cycle ‘k’, the register
flip is most likely to occur due to the propagation of the
SET and hence, the flip is likely to occur in the subsequent
clock cycle ‘k+1’. Thus, a major contributor of the erroneous
outcomes is the ‘NF’ scenario. On the other and, for the
register strike case, an SET is more likely to cause an error in
the same clock cycle and hence errors are mainly contributed
by the ‘FN’ and ‘FF’ scenarios. These are already observed in
Tables I and II. So, PFN and PFF are dominant for register
strike cases and PNF is dominant for gate strike scenarios.
These observations are seen to have a significant impact on the
probabilities PGM and PRM . We present these probabilities
in Table IV. We find that PGM is significantly greater than
PRM and its value is found to be a maximum of 50%. This
is mainly because of two reasons:
• When an SET occurs on a register,
– The probability of a flip or an error occuring is high
(high probabilities of an FF or an FN ) as compared
to the SET occurring on a gate (Figure 4). The flip
probability for register-strike cases is found to be
nearly 10x greater than that for the gate-strike cases.
This increases the denominator in equation 4 and
results in a small value for PRM .
– The probability of an NF scenario is small, as
compared to the FN and FF scenarios for a register
strike as already observed in Table I. Hence NFm
scenarios are also less leading to a small value in
the numerator in equation 4. This again leads to low
value of PRM .
• When an SET occurs on a logic gate,
7Table IV
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE BIT FLIPS GIVEN THAT AT LEAST ONE ERROR
OCCURRED. GATE STRIKES AND REGISTER STRIKES ARE PRESENTED
SEPARATELY. (‘-’ INDICATES NO MULTIPLE ERROR EVENTS WERE
OBSERVED)
Example PGM -
‘gate
strike’
180nm
PGM -
‘gate
strike’
65nm
PRM -
‘register
strike’
180nm
PRM -
‘register
strike’
65nm
c432 0.4 0.5 - 0.002
c499 0.11 0.2 - -
c880 - - - -
c1355 0.33 0.2 - -
c1908 0.067 0.25 - 0.008
b01 - 0.035 - 0.016
b03 0.12 0.042 - 0.004
b04 - 0.172 - -
b06 0.288 0.35 - 0.003
b09 0.08 0.36 - 0.003
b10 0.058 0.4 - -
b11 - 0.12 - 0.0012
b13 - 0.34 - -
s344 - 0.07 - 0.012
s820 - 0.12 - -
s1196 - 0.045 - -
s1238 - 0.08 - -
s1423 - 0.27 - 0.003
3:8 decoder 0.107 0.27 0.001 -
8-bit LFSR 0.073 0.17 - -
– The probability of a flip is low (low probabilities of
an FF or an FN ) as compared to the SET occurring
on a register as already observed in Figure 4. This
decreases the denominator in equation 3.
– The major contributor of flips for gate strikes is NF
(Table II). Hence NFm scenarios are also high, as
compared to the register strike cases, leading to a
large value in the numerator in equation 3. These
lead to a high value of PGM .
To summarize, given that there is an error, the probability
of multiple errors in the case of register-strike cases is less:
about 2%, where as they are significant in the gate-strike cases
and can be up to 50%. Thus, in a circuit design with robust
flip-flops, we can eliminate the flips due to ‘register strike’
cases, but out of the remaining flips which are going to be
due to ‘gate strikes’, multiple flips will be extremely likely.
This is depicted in Figure 5. Thus, gate strikes are more likely
to be problematic. Hardening the flip-flops is not going to help
in this scenario. Alternate methods such as delay capture flip-
flop designs or uneven path delays may need to be used to
prevent multiple flips due to gate strikes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have performed a detailed characterization of the impact
of an SET on a logic circuit to quantify the extent to which
the single bit-flip model is realistic. Our goal was to evaluate
the multiple bit-flip error probability. Our observation is that,
in up to 8% of the outcomes when an error occurred, an
SET created multiple register errors, that is, the single bit-flip
model is optimistic in up to 8% of the cases. Although this
probability may seem low, it can have a significant impact on
error-detection or correction schemes, that is, a single-bit error
Figure 5. Why a robust flip-flop design will not help reduce multiple bit-flip
probability?
correction scheme can go wrong in up to 8% of the times and
these errors will remain as silent undetected errors. Further, the
probability of multiple errors increases as technology is scaled.
A key observation is that, amongst the erroneous outcomes,
the probability of multiple bit flips for gate strike cases was
substantial and went up to 50%, where as those for register
strike cases was just about 2%. This implies that, in principle,
we can eliminate the flips due to register strikes using robust
flip-flop designs. But in such designs, out of the remaining
flips which will be due to gate strikes, a large fraction will
be multiple flips. Thus, there is a need to focus on circuit
techniques to eliminate these type of errors.
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